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Abstract
We study the problem of determining the minimum amount of flow required to be centrally
controlled in a Stackelberg routing game in order to improve the social cost of a Nash equilibrium.
We consider the special case of routing on a parallel link graph with linear delays and give a
closed form expression for the above quantity.
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1 Introduction and related work
Noncooperative network routing games are a nice model of the behavior of selfish users trying to
optimize their own benefit. In such a game, each player intends to send a fixed amount of flow from
its source to its sink using a shortest delay path through the given network in a noncooperative
manner.
The solution reached by players selfishly routing their flow is called the Nash equilibrium or
Nash flow. Since players choose their paths to minimize their own delay alone, the quality of the
resulting Nash equilibrium in general may be worse than the quality of the optimum way to route
flow through the network so as to minimize the total overall latency of all users, which may be
thought of as the social cost of the routing. A classic example of Pigou [Pig20] shows that this
can indeed be the case. The ratio of the cost of the Nash equilibrium and the optimum solution
is called Price of Anarchy [KP99]. The idea of bounding the price of anarchy in network routing
games has become well-studied after the groundbreaking work of Roughgarden and Tardos [RT02].
Roughgarden and Tardos show that for general latency functions, the price of anarchy can be
arbitrarily large. For the class of networks with linear latency functions, however, they prove that
the price of anarchy is bounded by 4/3.
The Nash equilibrium has been an attractive concept from the point of view of the study of
stable equilibria since no player has any incentive to unilaterally change his/her strategy. But its
inefficiency (that is, its potentially large cost compared to the social optimum) has always been a
concern. There has been substantial work on ways to address this issue. Three such methods are:
(i) Mechanism design, in which the rules of the game are established to help ensure that the quality
of the resulting Nash compatible with the rules is good compared to the social optimum, (see, for
example, [NR99, Nis99]), (ii) Taxes and tolls on the network links to discourage users from using
some links which lead to inefficient equilibria, (see, for example, [BMW56, CDR03, Fle05, FPS00])
and (iii) Designing the network in such a way that the network has good Nash to optimum ratio
to start with (see, for example, [Rou01, KLO97]). All these methods necessitate either a change in
the way game is played in the existing network or the design of new networks from scratch.
Another way to improve the quality of the Nash equilibrium is to consider situations in which
not all flow is routed selfishly. The motivation comes from considering networks where there is
a mix of selfish and centrally controlled players. An example of such a network mentioned in
[Rou02, Chapter 6] is that of a network where there may be two different prices, clients paying
the higher price get to choose their own route through the network and those paying the bargain
price do not get a choice of routes and they are controlled centrally by the network administrator.
Roughgarden [Rou04] considers the problem of routing a β fraction of flow centrally in such a way
that if the rest 1−β fraction choose their own paths selfishly then the cost of the resulting solution
is minimized. He calls the routing of the centrally controlled flow a Stackelberg strategy and the
resulting equilibrium the equilibrium induced by the strategy with fraction β; we will refer to the
latter as the Stackelberg equilibrium. He addresses the question of finding a Stackelberg strategy
such that the cost of the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium is close to the social optimum. For a
network of parallel links and centrally controlled 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 fraction of flow, he gives a Stackelberg
strategy such that the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium comes within a 1/β factor of the social
optimum for arbitrary latencies and within a 4/(3 + β) factor for linear latencies.
To be more specific about the problem considered by Roughgarden, we let G be a network
G = ({s, t}, {e1, e2, . . . , ek}) with two nodes, a source s and a sink t, and k directed parallel
links from s to t. Each edge ei is equipped with a latency function li(x) : R≥0 → R≥0 which is
nonnegative, continuous, and nondecreasing. A total flow of amount r is to be routed from s to t
such that the total latency experienced by the whole flow is minimized. In other words, the socially
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optimum flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , fk) is such that
∑k
i=1 fi = r and
∑k
i=1 fi · li(fi) is minimized. A
Stackelberg strategy h¯ for a given β is a flow h¯ = (h¯1, . . . , h¯k) such that
∑k
i=1 h¯i = βr. Define
l˜i(x) = li(x + h¯i) for i = 1, . . . , k. Then the Stackelberg equilibrium induced by h is a Nash
equilibrium in the graph G with latencies l˜ routing flow (1− β)r.
For 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, let c(G, r, l, β, h¯) be the cost of the Stackelberg equilibrium induced by h¯,
and let c(G, r, l, β) = minh¯ c(G, r, l, β, h¯) be the cost of the optimum Stackelberg equilibrium with
centrally controlled flow fraction β. Then c(G, r, l, 1) is the social optimum cost, and c(G, r, l, 0)
is the social cost of the Nash flow. Note that finding c(G, r, l, β) for an arbitrary network and
an arbitrary β is weakly NP-complete as proved in [Rou02, Chapter 6]. Roughgarden [Rou04]
has shown that c(G, r, l, β) ≤ 1
β
c(G, r, l, 1), and when the latency functions li are linear, then
c(G, r, l, β) ≤ 43+β c(G, r, l, 1).
There has been a fair amount of followup work on finding good Stackelberg strategies. For par-
allel links networks equipped with latency functions represented as polynomials with non-negative
coefficients, Kumar and Marathe [KM02] give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Stackelberg
strategy h¯ such that c(G, r, l, β, h¯) ≤ (1+ε)c(G, r, l, β) for any given ε > 0. Swamy [Swa06] extends
the results for Roughgarden’s Largest Latency First strategy [Rou04] to incorporate various topolo-
gies and arbitrary latency functions. For series-parallel graphs (with arbitrary latency functions),
he bounds the price of anarchy by 1+ 1/β and for the parallel links graphs (with latency functions
from a class L), by β + (1 − β)ρ(L) where ρ(L) is the price of anarchy for networks with latency
functions from class L. For general graphs, he obtains latency class specific bounds on the price of
anarchy which give a continuous tradeoff between the fraction of flow controlled and the price of
anarchy. For general topology networks equipped with linear delay functions, and multicommodity
users, Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [KK06] show that the cost of a particular Stackelberg equilib-
rium (SCALE strategy as suggested in [Rou04]) with β fraction of centrally controlled flow is at
most (4−X)/3 times the cost of the optimum solution where X = (1−
√
1−β)(3√1−β+1)
2
√
1−β+1 .
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In this paper, we study a simple but interesting question regarding Stackelberg equilibria in this
setting: what fraction β of flow needs to be centrally controlled for there to be any improvement in
the social cost whatsoever? We call this amount the Stackelberg threshold and denote it σ(G, r, l).
To be more precise, σ(G, r, l) is the minimum value of β such that c(G, r, l, β + ε) < c(G, r, l, 0) for
any ε > 0. At first glance, it might appear that the threshold is trivially 0: that is, c(G, r, l, ǫ) <
c(G, r, l, 0) for any network G of parallel links. However, if the latency functions are such that
c(G, r, l, 0) = c(G, r, l, 1)—that is, the Nash equilibrium happens to have optimum social cost—this
is clearly false.
As this example points out, the threshold depends on the price of anarchy of the instance. This
is also implied by Roughgarden’s result. For linear latency functions, Roughgarden and Tardos
[RT02] show that c(G, r, l, 0)/c(G, r, l, 1) ≤ 4/3 (in any network, not necessarily parallel links). Let
us denote the price of anarchy by ρ(G, r, l) ≡ c(G, r, l, 0)/c(G, r, l, 1). Then by Roughgarden’s result
we have that
c(G, r, l, β) ≤
4
3 + β
c(G, r, l, 1) =
4
3 + β
1
ρ(G, r, l)
c(G, r, l, 0).
Then a sufficient condition for c(G, r, l, β) < c(G, r, l, 0) is 43+β
1
ρ(G,r,l) < 1, or β >
4
ρ(G,r,l) − 3. If the
price of anarchy is as bad as it can be, and ρ(G, r, l) = 4/3, then c(G, r, l, β) < c(G, r, l, 0) whenever
β > 0 so that the Stackelberg threshold is 0 for these instances.
Our central result is to give a precise characterization of the Stackelberg threshold for the case
of parallel link graphs with linear delay functions of the form l(x) = max{0, ax + b} with a ≥ 0.
1Correa and Stier Moses [CS06] have in personal communication told us of similar, independently obtained results.
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If f is a Nash flow, and g is an optimum flow, and c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) then we show that
σ(G, r, l) = mini:fi<gi fi. If c(G, r, l, 0) = c(G, r, l, 1) then clearly no improvement in the cost of the
Nash flow is possible. It is worth pointing out that even though our latency functions are linear,
since we allow b < 0 in ax+ b and take maximum of ax+ b and zero for determining the latency,
the price of anarchy bound of 4/3 of Roughgarden and Tardos [RT02] does not hold for our case.
There are examples for which the price of anarchy can be 2− ε for any small ε > 0.
Kaporis et. al. [KPS05] study a closely related problem of determining the minimum fraction
βM of flow in a graph such that controlling that fraction through some Stackelberg strategy gives
rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost equal to the cost of the optimum solution; that is, they
find the minimum βM such that c(G, r, l, βM ) = c(G, r, l, 1). They call this the Price of Optimum
and give an algorithm to compute the price of optimum for parallel links networks equipped with
continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing latency functions.
Before turning to the proof of our result, we conclude with a brief reflection on our motivation
for considering Stackelberg thresholds. Stackelberg network routing games are usually discussed in
the context of the central control of flow. This creates images of technocrats coercing routings for
the benefit of society, either directly by controlling users or indirectly via taxes. An alternate image
(though equivalent mathematically) is that of small coalitions of users behaving altruistically; that
is, deciding not to behave selfishly, but in ways that improve the overall social welfare. Our reason
for studying Stackelberg thresholds is to ask: how big do such coalitions have to be in order to
make a difference? Part of the answer given by Roughgarden’s work is: it depends on how bad
things are. When things are at their worst, even infinitesimally small coalitions make a difference.
Studies of the price of anarchy ask how bad off we are if everyone behaves selfishly; part of our
motivation is to flip the question and ask how much better off we can be if some small fraction of
users do not. Hence we ask not what is the price of anarchy, but what is the value of altruism?
How much is required to be useful? This perspective suggests an interesting research agenda to
which this paper is a modest contribution.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 with some introductory notation,
definitions, and lemmas. Then in Section 3 we state the lemmas we will need to prove, and show
how they imply our main theorem. We describe a process to convert a Nash equilibrium to a
Stackelberg equilibrium in Section 5.1. The remaining sections prove the lemmas.
2 Some introductory notation, definitions and lemmas
Let G be a graph with two nodes, a source s and a sink t, and with k parallel links from s to t. We
require r units of flow to be sent from s to t. Let the latency on link i be li(xi) = max{0, aixi+ bi}
with ai ≥ 0; we will sometimes refer to this as the delay of the link. Note that we allow the latencies
which remain zero up to some flow and then increase linearly. We assume without loss of generality
that there is at most one link whose latency function is a constant (by removing all but the one
with minimum latency if there are many). We let z denote the index of this link (if it exists); we
will refer to it as the constant link.
Let f be a Nash flow sending flow fi on link i and g be an optimum flow sending flow gi on
link i. Clearly,
∑k
i=1 fi =
∑k
i=1 gi = r. The goal is to determine for this specific network G the
minimum value of β ∈ [0, 1] such that c(G, r, l, β + ε) < c(G, r, l, 0) for any ε > 0, or equivalently
the minimum value of β such that getting central control of infinitesimally more fraction of flow
than β allows a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this paper, we will let h¯ denote the Stackelberg strategy and h denote an induced
Stackelberg equilibrium. It is worth nothing that the flow h does not include h¯ in it; that is
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∑
j hj = (1− β)r where β is the fraction of flow centrally controlled by h¯, while it is the case that∑
j(h¯j + hj) = r. We call the flow controlled by a Stackelberg strategy centrally controlled flow or
altruistic flow. The equilibrium flow h we sometimes call selfish flow.
We first recall the following well-known lemmas and definitions specialized to the case of parallel
links.
Lemma 1. A flow f is at Nash equilibrium if and only if for every i with fi > 0 and every j 6= i,
li(fi) ≤ lj(fj).
Proof. See Proposition 2.2.2 in [Rou05].
Corollary 2 (to Lemma 1). For a Stackelberg strategy h¯, h is an induced Stackelberg equilibrium
if and only if for all i with hi > 0 and j 6= i, li(h¯i + hi) ≤ lj(h¯j + hj).
Proof. Since h is a Nash equilibrium in the network G with shifted delay functions l˜j(xj) = lj(h¯j +
xj), the claim follows directly from Lemma 1.
Definition 3. Let l∗i (x) =
d
dx
(x · li(x)) = li(x) + x ·
d
dx
(li(x)). We call this the marginal latency of
link i. We also denote d
dx
(li(x)) by l
′
i(x).
Lemma 4. A flow g is optimal if and only if for every i with gi > 0 and every j 6= i, l
∗
i (gi) ≤ l
∗
j (gj).
Proof. See Corollary 2.4.6 in [Rou05].
By Lemma 1, each link j with fj > 0 must have the same latency; we denote this common
latency by L. Similarly, the common marginal latency of links with gj > 0 in the optimum solution
is denoted by L∗ and the common latency of all links with hj > 0 in a Stackelberg equilibrium is
denoted by Lh. For the Nash flow f , the marginal latencies l
∗
j (fj) may not all be same. We use ε
∗
j
to denote their deviation from L∗; that is for all j, we let ε∗j be such that L
∗ + ε∗j = l
∗
j (fj).
Observation 5. The latency (marginal latency) of any link carrying positive flow in Nash equi-
librium (optimum flow) cannot be larger than the latency (marginal latency) of the constant link.
That is, fj > 0 implies L = ajfj + bj ≤ bz and gj > 0 implies L
∗ = 2ajgj + bj ≤ bz. In particular,
ε∗z ≥ 0.
Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 4. Since the marginal latency L∗ in the optimum solution is at most the
marginal latency of the constant link, we have L∗ ≤ bz ⇐⇒ L∗ ≤ L∗ + ε∗z ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ ε∗z.
We review some results about the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium.
Lemma 6. If f and f ′ are flows at Nash equilibrium for the instance (G, r, l), then (i) the cost of
f is equal to the cost of f ′, (ii) for all j ∈ [k], lj(fj) = lj(f ′j), and (iii) Lf = Lf ′ where Lf and Lf ′
respectively denote the common latency experienced by selfish flow in f and f ′ respectively.
Proof. For (i) and (ii), see Proposition 2.2.6 and Corollary 2.6.2 in [Rou05]. For (iii), note that the
cost of f is Lf · r since whole flow experiences the same latency. Similarly the cost of f
′ is Lf ′ · r.
The equality of costs implies Lf = Lf ′ .
Lemma 7. Let h and h′ be two Stackelberg equilibria induced by Stackelberg strategy h¯. Then the
costs of two equilibria are equal.
Proof. See Proposition 6.2.3 in [Rou05].
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We partition all links into two sets, a set of good links, and a set of bad links. We define them
next.
Definition 8. Let f be a Nash equilibrium and g be an optimum solution. A link j is called a
good link if fj < gj , otherwise it is called a bad link.
3 The proof of the main theorem
We present in this section our main theorem and some lemmas which will be helpful in the proof
of the theorem. Recall that a good link is the one with more optimum flow than the Nash flow
(fj < gj) and a bad link is the one with at least as much Nash flow as the optimum flow (fj ≥ gj).
At a high level, we show that a Stackelberg strategy routing more than the Nash flow on a good
link gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of improved social cost, while a Stackelberg strategy
pushing more than the Nash flow on bad links gives rise to Stackelberg equilibria with increased
social cost (subject to some caveats). We let f∗ denote the minimum of Nash flows on good links.
We denote the corresponding link by i∗. Formally,
f∗
def
= min
i:fi<gi
fi, i∗
def
= argmini:fi<gifi. (1)
If there are many indices for which the flow is equal to f∗, define i∗ to be an arbitrary, say the
lowest indexed, such link. We have f∗ = fi∗ .
We need some preliminary notions to introduce our main theorem.
Definition 9. For Nash flow f and a Stackelberg strategy h¯, let S(h¯) = {j : fj < h¯j} and
U(h¯) = {j : 0 < h¯j ≤ fj}. Let β(h¯) denote the fraction of central flow controlled by Stackelberg
strategy h¯, that is β(h¯) =
(∑
j h¯j
)
/r.
The set of all other links is denoted by [k]− S(h¯)−U(h¯). We now state the lemmas which are
central to the proof of our main theorem.
Lemma 10. Suppose c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) and β > f∗
r
. Then there exists a Stackelberg strategy
h¯ with β(h¯) = β and c(G, r, l, β, h¯) < c(G, r, l, 0) (which implies that c(G, r, l, β) < c(G, r, l, 0)).
In other words, for the amount of centrally controlled flow strictly more than f∗, there exists a
Stackelberg strategy controlling that amount of flow and having cost strictly less than the cost of the
Nash equilibrium.
We comment on the Stackelberg equilibrium alluded to above. If the altruistic flow amount
if more than f∗, then the Stackelberg strategy referred to above routes f∗ + ε flow on link i∗ for
a small enough ε and remaining flow appropriately on links other than i. For this Stackelberg
strategy, S(h¯) = {i∗} and h¯i∗ = f∗ + ε for small ε.
Lemma 11. Suppose c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) and β ≤ f∗
r
. Also assume that there is no link with
zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow, that is {j : fj = 0, gj > 0} = ∅. Then for any Stackelberg
strategy h¯ with β(h¯) = β, c(G, r, l, β, h¯) ≥ c(G, r, l, 0) (or equivalently c(G, r, l, β) ≥ c(G, r, l, 0)).
In other words, any Stackelberg strategy controlling at most f∗ amount of flow induces Stackelberg
equilibria of cost at least as much as the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
The condition β ≤ f∗
r
implies that S(h¯) does not contain any good link (otherwise, the amount
of altruistic flow will be more than f∗); see Section 7 for details. The above lemma in essence
states that if the strategy does not have enough flow to control on a good link, it cannot induce a
Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to state and prove our main theorem.
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Theorem 12. If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then for a parallel link network G with k links and linear
delay functions, Nash flow f , and optimum flow g,
σ(G, r, l) = f∗= min
i:fi<gi
fi. (2)
Proof. If there is a link with zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow, then f∗ = 0. Lemma 10
states that controlling ε > 0 amount of flow gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than
the cost of the Nash equilibrium. It is also clear that a Stackelberg strategy controlling zero amount
of flow cannot have Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. So,
σ(G, r, l) = 0 = f∗ in this case.
We can now assume that there is no link with zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow.
Lemma 10 states that σ(G, r, l) ≤ f∗ while Lemma 11 states that σ(G, r, l) ≥ f∗. It follows that
σ(G, r, l) = f∗.
We comment here on the definition of f∗. The quantity f∗ is defined with respect to a Nash
equilibrium and an optimum solution. But the condition c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) together with
Lemmas 17 and 18 below guarantees that the Nash equilibrium is unique, as is the optimum
solution, so the quantity is well defined even without any reference to a particular Nash equilibrium
and optimum solution.
4 Some useful lemmas
In this section, we prove some lemmas which we need for the proof of Lemma 10 and 11.
Definition 13. For Nash flow fj > 0 on link j, we say that the flow is in the increasing segment
of the latency function if lj(fj) = max{0, ajfj + bj} > 0 and aj > 0. We say that the flow is
in the zero delay segment or in the initial zero delay segment of the latency function if lj(fj) =
max{0, ajfj + bj} = 0 and aj > 0.
Lemma 14. If the latency of the constant link is positive, then the following conditions are equiv-
alent. (i) L > 0, (ii) r >
∑
j∈[k],j 6=zmax{0,−bj/aj}, (iii) the flow on all links j 6= z with fj > 0 is
in the increasing segment of their latency functions.
Proof. We prove (i) ⇐⇒ (ii) and (i) ⇐⇒ (iii). For (i) ⇐⇒ (ii), if L > 0, then the total flow
must be more than
∑
j∈[k],j 6=zmax{0,−bj/aj} since otherwise all flow can be routed on the zero
delay segment of the latency functions, and this routing is a valid Nash. This gives rise to L = 0,
a contradiction. If L = 0, then all flow must be routed on the initial zero delay segment and at
most only
∑
j∈[k],j 6=zmax{0,−bj/aj} amount of flow can be routed on the zero delay segments. So,
r ≤
∑
j∈[k],j 6=zmax{0,−bj/aj}.
For (i) ⇐⇒ (iii), if L > 0, then for all nonconstant links j ∈ [k] − {z} with fj > 0,
0 < L = max{0, ajfj + bj}. Hence the flow on link j is in the increasing segment. If L = 0, all flow
is routed on the initial zero segment on all link, since that is the part that can give rise to zero
latency. The claim is now proved.
Lemma 15. If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then (i) the latency of the constant link is positive,
(ii) L > 0, (iii) r >
∑
j∈[k],j 6=zmax{0,−bj/aj}, (iv) the flows on all links j 6= z with fj > 0 are in
the increasing segment of their latency functions.
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Proof. For (i), if the latency of the constant link were zero, then the cost of the Nash equilibrium
will be zero, giving rise to c(G, r, l, 0) = c(G, r, l, 1) = 0, a contradiction.
For (ii), if L = 0, then the cost of the Nash equilibrium is equal to zero which again contradicts
c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1). Using (i) and Lemma 14, (ii), (iii), and (iv) are equivalent. This finishes
the proof of the lemma.
Observation 16. For a Nash equilibrium f with common latency L and an optimum solution g
with common marginal latency L∗, L ≤ L∗.
Proof. If L = 0, then L ≤ L∗ since L∗ is nonnegative.
If L > 0 on the other hand, then all flow is on the increasing segment of their respective latency
functions. We consider two cases. If fj = gj for all links, consider a link with fj = gj > 0. It
follows that L = ajfj + bj ≤ 2ajfj + bj = 2ajgj + bj = L
∗ where the inequality follows from the
fact that aj ≥ 0. If Nash flow and optimum flow differ on some link, there must exist a link j with
fj < gj . For this link, L ≤ ajfj + bj ≤ 2ajfj + bj < 2ajgj + bj = L
∗, where the last equality follows
from gj > 0. The claim L ≤ L
∗ follows in both cases.
Lemma 17 (Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium). If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then there is a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If condition in the lemma holds, then L > 0 and all flows fj > 0 are in the increasing segment
of their respective latency functions from Lemma 15. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction
that there are two different Nash equilibria namely f and f ′ with common delays Lf and Lf ′ . We
have Lf = Lf ′ from Lemma 6. There exists a link, say i, such that fi > f
′
i and another link, say
j, with fj < f
′
j. If j is a nonconstant link, fj < f
′
j implies Lf ≤ ajfj + bj < ajf
′
j + bj = Lf ′ where
the strict inequality follows since aj > 0. This is a contradiction to Lf = Lf ′ . Similarly, if i is
a nonconstant link, we have fi > f
′
i which implies Lf = aifi + bi > aif
′
i + bi ≥ Lf ′ , which again
contradicts Lf = Lf ′ . Hence we have that f = f
′.
Lemma 18 (Uniqueness of optimum solution). If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then there is a unique
optimum solution.
Proof. The condition in the lemma implies that L∗ ≥ L > 0. Using the fact that an optimum
solution is a Nash equilibrium with marginal latency functions, an argument similar to the one in
the proof of Lemma 17 proves the lemma.
The following lemma relates the amount of Nash flow on the constant link to amount of optimum
flow on it.
Lemma 19. Suppose c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1). Then for the constant link z (if it exists), if fz > 0,
then it must be the case that fz < gz. Also, if fz = 0 then fz ≤ gz.
Proof. The second part is trivial since flow on the constant link is nonnegative. For the first part,
the condition fz > 0 implies that for all links j 6= z with fj > 0, L = bz = ajfj + bj < 2ajfj + bj
where the last inequality follows since aj > 0 (there is only one constant link). For links j with
fj = 0, we have L = bz ≤ bj = 2ajfj + bj. Therefore, for all links j 6= z, bz ≤ 2ajfj + bj. From
Observation 5, all marginal latencies in the optimum flow must be equal and at most bz. It therefore
follows that 2ajgj + bj ≤ bz for all j 6= z. Combining the two inequalities, it follows for all j 6= z
that gj ≤ fj. Since the sum of the flows on all links is r in f as well as in g, we have gz ≥ fz.
The equality gz = fz holds if and only if equality holds in gj ≤ fj for all j 6= z. But if that were
the case, the Nash equilibrium is same as the optimum solution, contradicting our assumption that
c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1). This proves that gz > fz.
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Lemma 20. For the Nash flow f with common latency L and the optimum flow g with common
marginal latency L∗, using the notation l∗j (fj) = L
∗ + ε∗j ,
(fz − gz) +
∑
j:j 6=z,fj>0
ε∗j
2aj
=
∑
j:j 6=z,L≤bj≤L∗
L∗ − bj
2aj
. (3)
Here, z is the index of the constant link.
Proof. We have gz +
∑
j:j 6=z,gj>0 gj = gz +
∑
j:j 6=z,fj>0,gj>0 gj +
∑
j:j 6=z,fj=0,gj>0 gj = r. Let us
call P = {j : j 6= z, fj > 0, gj > 0} and N = {j : j 6= z, fj = 0, gj > 0}. For each j ∈ P ,
2ajfj + bj = L
∗ + ε∗j and 2ajgj + bj = L
∗. The first equality holds since fj > 0 and the second
one holds because gj > 0. Subtracting the second equality from the first one and rearranging the
terms, we get for all j ∈ P , gj = fj −
ε∗j
2aj
.
The necessary and sufficient condition for j ∈ N is j 6= z and L ≤ bj ≤ L
∗. For these links,
gj =
L∗−bj
2aj
. Using these expressions for all j, we get
gz +
∑
j:j 6=z,fj>0
(
fj −
ε∗j
2aj
)
+
∑
j:j 6=z,L≤bj≤L∗
L∗ − bj
2aj
= r = fz +
∑
j:j 6=z,fj>0
fj. (4)
Rearranging the terms and subtracting
∑
j:j 6=z,fj>0 fj from both sides gives the desired result.
We have changed the index set in the summation from {j : j 6= z, fj > 0, gj > 0} to {j : j 6=
z, fj > 0} above because {j : j 6= z, fj > 0, gj > 0} = {j : j 6= z, fj > 0}. The ⊆ direction is easy.
For the ⊇ direction, notice that for j 6= z, fj > 0 =⇒ bj < L =⇒ bj < L
∗ =⇒ gj > 0.
The following lemma relates the flow of links in two different Nash equilibria in the same network
with different amounts of total flow.
Lemma 21. Let f r be a Nash flow with common latency Lr for the network (G, r, l) and let q < r.
Then there exists a Nash flow f q with common latency Lq for the network (G, q, l) with the property
that f qj ≤ f
r
j for all j ∈ [k] and L
q ≤ Lr.
Proof. Let us consider the case Lr > 0. We claim that any Nash equilibrium f q satisfies the
conditions of the lemma. We prove the claim by contradiction. Fix a Nash equilibrium for (G, q, l).
Note that Lq could be equal to zero. Let there be a link with more flow in f q than in f r. If this
link is a constant link, then we have f qz > f rz . Since the total flow amount is reduced, there exists
a link j ∈ [k]−{z} with f qj < f
r
j and aj > 0. The first inequality implies L
r ≤ bz = L
q or Lr ≤ Lq.
The second inequality implies Lq ≤ ajf
q
j + bj < ajf
r
j + bj = L
r or Lq < Lr. This is a contradiction.
If the link carrying more flow in f q were a nonconstant link, then have f qi > f
r
i with ai > 0.
There also exists a link j with aj ≥ 0 with f
q
j < f
r
j . The first inequality implies that L
q =
max{0, aif
q
i + bi} > max{0, aif
r
i + bi} ≥ L
r > 0 or Lq > Lr > 0. The first strict inequality
follows from the fact that Lr > 0: max{0, aif
r
i + bi} = aif
r
i + bi. The second inequality implies
Lq ≤ ajf
q
j + bj ≤ ajf
r
j + bj = L
r or Lq ≤ Lr, a contradiction. Hence the claim follows.
Now consider the case Lr = 0. In this case, all flow is routed on the initial zero segment of the
latency functions. Consider the flow f q with f qj = f
r
j ·
q
r
. It is straightforward to check that f q is a
Nash equilibrium (all flow is routed with zero latency).
The claim Lq ≤ Lr follows directly from the fact that f qj ≤ f
r
j .
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5 Relating Stackelberg equilibrium to Nash equilibrium
In this section, we describe a continuous time process, called the Stackelberg process or simply
P , which does the following. Given an instance (G, r, l) and a Stackelberg strategy h¯ controlling
β(h¯) =
∑
j∈[k] hj/r = (h¯[k])/r fraction of flow, it starts at time t = 0 with a Nash equilibrium f
of the instance (G, r, l) and ends at time t = 1 with an induced Stackelberg equilibrium for the
instance (G, r, l, β) with Stackelberg strategy h¯. We use the notation fA =
∑
i∈A fi.
5.1 The Stackelberg process
The process P is a continuous time process that transforms a Nash equilibrium f into a particular
induced Stackelberg equilibrium for strategy h¯. As mentioned above, the time varies from t = 0 to
t = 1 and the state of the process at time t is denoted by P t. For any time t ∈ [0, 1], P t carries
the information about the Stackelberg strategy h¯t at time t, an induced Stackelberg equilibrium
ht for the strategy h¯t, and the fraction of centrally controlled flow by the strategy h¯t, which we
call β(h¯t). The common latency of the selfish flow in ht is denoted by Lht; that is, if h
t
j > 0 then
lj(h¯
t
j + h
t
j) = Lht . We will specify this information below.
We start with a Nash equilibrium f for the network (G, r, l) (choose one if there are many
choices). Recall the definition of S(h¯) and U(h¯) from Definition 9; S(h¯) = {j : h¯j > fj} and
U(h¯) = {j : 0 < h¯j ≤ fj}. We will sometimes call them S and U respectively for brevity.
We first give the description of P 0, the state of the process in the beginning. h¯0 is defined as:
h¯0j = min{h¯j , fj} for j ∈ [k], which gives rise to β(h¯
0) =
∑k
j=1min{h¯j , fj}/r =
∑k
j=1 h¯
0
j/r. We
define h0 = f − h¯0, which is easily seen to be a Stackelberg equilibrium.
At time t ∈ (0, 1], the state P t of the process P has the following specification. h¯t is described
as
h¯tj = min{h¯j , fj}+ t
(
h¯j −min{h¯j , fj}
)
= h¯0j + t
(
h¯j − h¯
0
j
)
, (5)
which gives rise to β(h¯t) =
∑k
j=1 h¯
t
j/r. It is clear that for an edge j in S(h¯), P monotonically
increases flow on it at a constant rate of (fj − h¯j), while for an edge j in U(h¯), it keeps the flow
constant on j, maintaining at the constant amount h¯j > 0. We have that
h¯tj = fj + t(h¯j − fj) for j ∈ S(h¯), h¯
t
j = h¯j for j ∈ U(h¯). (6)
Given hs for all s < t, we will now see how to find ht (if ht is not unique, we will find a particular one
which will suffice for our purpose). It is clear that hs is a Nash equilibrium in the network (G, r −∑
j∈[k] h¯
s
j , {lj(h¯
s
j + x)}
k
j=1) and h
t is a Nash equilibrium in the network (G, r −
∑
j∈[k] h¯
t
j , {lj(h¯
t
j +
x)}kj=1). Since h¯
s
j ≤ h¯
t
j for s ≤ t, we have the total selfish flow routed in h
t is less than or equal to
the total selfish flow in hs and latencies (due to h¯t) at time t are at least as large as the latencies
(due to h¯s) at s. It is clear that hs restricted to links in [k]−S(h¯) with latency functions lj(h¯
s
j+xj)
is a Nash equilibrium, and so is ht with latency functions lj(h¯
t
j+xj) restricted to links in [k]−S(h¯).
Since h¯sj = h¯
t
j for j ∈ [k]−S(h¯), it follows from Lemma 21 that there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium
ht for h¯t such that hsj ≥ h
t
j for all j ∈ [k] − S(h¯). The Stackelberg equilibrium alluded to above is
what we call ht. Therefore, for all s ≤ t, hsj ≤ h
t
j for j ∈ S(h¯) and h
s
j ≥ h
t
j for j ∈ [k]− S(h¯).
This can alternatively be viewed as the following. In moving from time s to t > s, the amount of
altruistic flow increases on S(h¯) by an infinitesimal amount ε = (t− s)(h¯S(h¯)− fS(h¯)) > 0, resulting
in the decrease of amount of the selfish flow (by exactly the same amount ε). The amount of selfish
flow on links j with hsj > 0 decreases to h
t
j ≤ h
s
j so as to keep the latency on all links with h
t
j > 0
equal.
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We now give a notation for the links which have zero ht flow at time t. We call this subset of
links Zt. Z0 is of course {j : j ∈ S(h¯)}∪{j : fj = h¯j} = {j : fj < h¯j}∪{j : fj = h¯j}. In particular,
S(h¯) ⊆ Z0. As the time increases from t = 0 to t = 1, the selfish flow on links in [k]−Z0 decreases,
and the link j is added to Zt (and to all Zt
′
for all t′ ≥ t) at the smallest time instance t such
htj = 0 (but h
s
j > 0 for all s < t). Note that t 7→ Z
t is a monotone set function. We define U t to be
U ∩ Zt.
We give the formal definition of Zt now. For each link j, define tj = inf{t : h
t
j = 0} if the
set is nonempty, and equal to 2 otherwise. We claim that h
tj
j = 0 if tj ≤ 1. This is because the
segment {t : htj > 0} is open on the upper boundary, hence its complement is closed on the lower
boundary (hence the limit point on the lower boundary is contained in the set). With this notation,
Zt = {j ∈ [k] : tj ≤ t}.
To recap the process P , it starts at time t = 0 controlling fS+h¯U amount of flow (this is strategy
h¯0), giving rise to a particular Stackelberg equilibrium h0 = f − h¯. The process continuously
increases the altruistic flow on links in S linearly with time, and the (selfish) flow on all other links
responds. If there is a positive selfish flow on a link, it decreases by a small amount to respond to
the deficit of selfish flow on links outside of S, else the only altruistic flow on the link remains at
the same level. This process continues until it makes altruistic flow amount equal to the amount
in the Stackelberg strategy, that is h¯S + h¯U at time t = 1.
We claim that this process gives rise to a valid Stackelberg equilibrium for strategy h¯ at time
1. It is easy to see that all selfish flow is on shortest latency paths (we have chosen the Stackelberg
equilibrium guaranteed by Lemma 21) and the amount of altruistic flow is also respected, so h
def
= h1
is a valid Stackelberg equilibrium. Now, there might be other possible equilibria induced by strategy
h¯ than the one the process finds, but from Lemma 7 the cost of all equilibria is the same.
6 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof of Lemma 10: We first consider the case when β = f∗+ε
r
for infinitesimally small ε > 0. We
will extend the same idea to larger values of β at the end of the proof.
Let i be a link with fi < gi as in the statement of the lemma. We consider the Stackelberg
strategy h¯ with h¯i = fi+ ε for small ε > 0 and h¯j = 0 for j 6= i. Clearly, S(h¯) = {i} and U(h¯) = ∅.
The idea is to first determine the rate of increase of the social cost as the Stackelberg strategy
increases flow on link i (we sometimes call it the rate of increase for brevity), then to determine
the rate of decrease of the social cost because of the decrease of flow on links other than i (we
sometimes call it the rate of decrease, again for brevity), and then show that the rate of decrease
is strictly more than the rate of increase.
As we saw in Section 5.1, the flow does not increase on any link in [k] − {i} when we increase
the flow on link i. Indeed, the amount of selfish flow decreases on links {j : j 6= i, fj > 0} as
we increase the amount of altruistic flow on link i. Note that the set [k] − Z0 as defined in the
description of the process P in Section 5.1 is equal to {j : j 6= i, fj > 0}.
The rate of increase of the social cost with increase of flow on link i is l∗i (fi) = 2aifi+bi = L
∗+ε∗i .
On the other hand, the rate of decrease of social cost with decrease of flow on links in [k]− Z0
depends on whether z ∈ [k]−Z0. If z ∈ [k]−Z0, then the constant link carries a non-zero amount
of flow and the decrease of flow occurs only on the constant link. This gives rise to the rate of
decrease of social cost equal to l∗z(fz) = bz = L = L∗ + ε∗z. We have that L∗ ≤ bz = L ≤ L∗, or
L∗ = bz or ε∗z = 0. Therefore, the rate of decrease becomes L∗.
Alternatively, if z ∈ Z0, then the flow decreases on non-constant links. The condition c(G, r, l, 0) >
c(G, r, l, 1) implies that the flow on all non-constant links is on the increasing segments of their re-
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spective latency functions (see Lemma 15). The decrease of flow on links is such that the decreases
in latency on all of them is equal, say l. Since the decrease in latency (on link j 6= i with fj > 0)
is l, the decrease in amount of flow is l/aj . Therefore the total decrease in the social cost is∑
j 6=i,fj>0
l
aj
(2ajfj + bj) since the rate of decrease of social cost on link j is l
∗
j (fj) = 2ajfj + bj .
Moreover, the total decrease in flow on links j : fj > 0, f 6= i is equal to the total increase of flow
on link i, that is ε, therefore,
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0
l
aj
= ε or equivalently, l = ε/(
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0 1/aj). The rate
of decrease of the social cost is total decrease in the social cost divided by ε, which is
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0
1∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0 1/aj
2ajfj + bj
aj
=
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0
1∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0 1/aj
L∗ + ε∗j
aj
. (7)
Note that z 6∈ [k]−Z0 in this case. We now prove that the rate of increase is strictly less than the
rate of decrease of the social cost. There are several cases to consider here.
z 6∈ Z0 or z ∈ [k]− Z0 = {j : j 6= i, fj > 0} In this case, we need to prove that L∗ + ε∗i < L
∗ or
ε∗i < 0. This is true since 2aifi + bi = L
∗ + ε∗i and 2aigi + bi = L
∗ with fi < gi (i is a good
link). This gives ε∗i = 2ai(fi − gi) < 0. The inequality follows.
z ∈ Z0 or z 6∈ [k]− Z0 = {j : j 6= i, fj > 0} In this case, we need to prove that
L∗ + ε∗i <
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0
1∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0 1/aj
L∗ + ε∗j
aj
. (8)
Multiplying both sides by
∑
j:j 6=i,fj>0 1/aj and canceling L
∗ term from both sides, we are left
with proving
∑
j:fj>0,j 6=i
ε∗i
2aj
<
∑
j:fj>0,j 6=i
ε∗j
2aj
. (9)
If i = z, then it reduces to proving (using Lemma 20)
∑
j:fj>0,j 6=i
ε∗i
2aj
< (gz − fz) +
∑
j:L≤bj≤L∗,j 6=z
L∗ − bj
2aj
. (10)
In this case the left hand side is 0. This follows from the fact that i = z is a good link fz < gz
and L ≤ bz = L
∗ which implies ε∗i = ε
∗
z = 0. The right hand side is strictly positive since
fz < gz. The inequality hence follows in this case too. On the other hand, if i 6= z, then we
are left with proving
∑
j:fj>0,j 6=i
ε∗i
2aj
< (gz − fz) +
−ε∗i
2ai
+
∑
j:L≤bj≤L∗,j 6=z
L∗ − bj
2aj
. (11)
In this case, we have fi < gi. We also have 2aifi + bi = L
∗ + ε∗i and 2aigi + bi = L
∗. This
gives ε∗i = 2ai(fi − gi) < 0. The left hand side is therefore strictly negative. On the right
hand side, the first term in nonnegative from Lemma 19, the second term is positive, and
the last term is again nonnegative. Therefore, the right hand side is strictly positive, proving
that the inequality holds in this case too.
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This finishes the proof the the lemma for the case when β = f∗+ε
r
for sufficiently small ε > 0.
Let β ∈ (f∗/r, 1] now. We find a small enough ε0 > 0 (with f∗ + ε0 ≤ βr) from the previous
part such that we can find a Stackelberg strategy h¯ that induces a Stackelberg equilibrium h with
cost strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. To get a strategy for βr altruistic flow,
the intuition is the following. We route f∗ + ε amount of flow on edge i∗ and pretend that the rest
of the flow is selfish and let it route on minimum latency paths. At the end, we declare some of
the selfish flow (exactly βr− (f∗+ ε) amount) altruistic and output the corresponding strategy for
βr flow. The old induced Stackelberg equilibrium h is still a Stackelberg equilibrium if we remove
from h the flow that we declared altruistic in the end. We turn this intuition into a straightforward
proof.
We define the new Stackelberg strategy h¯′ as follows,
h¯′j =


h¯i∗ if j = i∗(
βr − h¯i∗
) hj
P
j:hj>0
hj
otherwise.
(12)
It is easy to see that h¯′j ≤ hj for j 6= i since
(
βr − h¯i∗
)
≤ r− h¯i∗ =
∑
j:hj>0
hj . Therefore, the flow
h′ defined by
h′j =


0 if j = i∗
hj −
(
βr − h¯i∗
) hj
P
j:hj>0
hj
otherwise.
(13)
is a Stackelberg equilibrium for h¯′. This is because h¯+h = h¯′+h′ and hence h′j > 0 implies hj > 0
which implies that j is the minimum latency link in h¯+ h and therefore in h¯′ + h too. Therefore,
the selfish flow goes on the minimum latency paths, hence h′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Also, the costs of h¯+ h and h¯′ + h′ are equal. Therefore, we have established the existence of a
Stackelberg strategy h¯′ with β(h¯′) = β and an induced equilibria h′ such that the resulting cost is
strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. The lemma now follows.
7 Proof of Lemma 11
We want to prove that if the amount of flow controlled by a Stackelberg strategy is at most f∗, then
the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be cheaper the Nash solution. Let us fix a Stackelberg
strategy h¯ such that the total flow controlled centrally by h¯ is at most f∗. We then derive from
this assumption (and the assumption that {j : fj = 0, gj > 0} = ∅ which is part of Lemma 11)
that the cost of the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium h has cost at least as much as the cost of the
Nash equilibrium, that is c(G, r, l, β, h¯) ≥ c(G, r, l, 0). Recall the definitions of S(h¯) and U(h¯) from
Definition 9; S(h¯) = {j : h¯j > fj} and U(h¯) = {j : 0 < h¯j ≤ fj}. We sometimes call them S and
U respectively. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|} and U = {u1, u2, . . . , u|U |} for this particular h¯.
7.1 The plan
We wish to show that the cost of h¯+ h is at least as much as the cost of the Nash equilibrium. We
will use the Stackelberg process defined in Section 5.1 in the following way. Note that at time t = 0,
the cost of the Nash equilibrium is equal to the cost of the Stackelberg equilibrium (h¯0 + h0). For
any arbitrary time instance t ∈ [0, 1), when the process increases an infinitesimal amount of flow
on links in S, the flow on other links decreases. There is an increment in the social cost because of
increase of flow on links in S and there is some decrease in social cost because of decrease of flow on
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links not in S (on links in [k]−Zt to be precise). We determine the rate of increases of social cost
with increase of flow on links in S and also determine the rate of decrease of social cost with decrease
of flow on links in [k]−Zt. We compare this rate of increase to the rate of decrease and prove that
the rate of increase is no less than the rate of decrease for all t ∈ [0, 1). This proves that the cost
of (ht+ h¯t) is nondecreasing with t and that c(h+ h¯) = c(ht+ h¯t)|t=1 ≥ c(h
t+ h¯t)|t=0 = c(f) where
c(·) denotes the cost of the flow. The uniqueness of the costs of Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium
in Lemmas 6 and 7 now establishes Lemma 11.
7.2 The rate of increase of the social cost
At time t ∈ [0, 1), if the increase in the (centrally controlled) flow amount on links in S is ε > 0,
let it be divided among links in S in the ratio σ1 : σ2 : · · · : σ|S| with σ1 + · · · + σ|S| = 1.
(According to the rules described in the description of the process, σj = (h¯j − fj)/(
∑
j∈S h¯j − fj)
for j ∈ S.) On link si ∈ S, the rate of increase of social cost with increase in flow on this link is
l∗si((h
t + h¯t)si) = 2asi h¯
t
si
+ bsi since hsi = 0 for all si ∈ S. Therefore the rate of increase of social
cost is ε
(
σ1(2as1 h¯
t
s1
+ bs1) + · · · + σ|S|(2as|S| h¯
t
s|S|
+ bs|S|)
)
/ε =
∑
s∈S σs(2ash¯
t
s + bs). This can be
lower bounded as ∑
s∈S
σs(2ash¯
t
s + bs) ≥
∑
s∈S
σs(2ash¯
0
s + bs) =
∑
s∈S
σs(2asfs + bs)
=
∑
s∈S
σs(L
∗ + ε∗s) = L
∗ +
∑
s∈S
σsε
∗
s. (14)
The inequality here follows from the fact that h¯tj ≥ h¯
s
j for all j ∈ S and s ≤ t.
7.3 The rate of decrease of the social cost
With increase of altruistic flow on links in S, the selfish flow on other links responds by decreasing
on links in [k] − Zt to keep the latencies on all links with positive selfish flow the same (see
Section 5.1 for a definition of Zt). The flow decreases precisely on links on which the selfish flow
is already positive (and as a result that link is not in Zt). Formally, all links in {j : htj > 0}
contribute to the decrease of flow at time t. Note that {j : htj > 0} = [k]− Z
t. We will use the set
{j : htj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t} as set of links on which the flow decreases at time t, we do not need both
the conditions, but we will use them since it facilitates the proofs later. Recall that S ⊆ Zt for all
t ∈ [0, 1].
We now consider in the following case analysis several cases depending on which links participate
in the decrement of selfish flow.
Lht = 0 In this case, all selfish flow is on the initial zero segment of the latency function, so
the latency as well as the rate of decrease of social cost is zero. Note that the function
lj(xj) = max{0, ajxj + bj} is not differentiable at xj = −bj/aj if bj < 0, but this fact does
not affect the rate of decrease mentioned here. If the flow is decreasing on a link, the rate of
change of social cost is equal to the left derivative of xj · lj(xj), which always exists for the
function lj(xj).
Lht > 0 and z ∈ {j : h
t
j > 0, j ∈ [k]− Z
t} (Equivalently, the flow decrease occurs only on the con-
stant link.) In this case, there is some selfish positive flow on the constant link. In going
from time t to a time infinitesimally greater than t, the total amount of selfish flow decreases,
say be amount δ and that decreases occurs on the links in {j : htj > 0, j ∈ [k] − Z
t}. If the
constant link z is contained in this set, then δ amount of flow decreases on z to keep the
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latencies on all links with positive selfish flow at the equal value. Therefore, in this case, the
rate of decrease becomes equal to ε · l∗z(h¯tz + htz)/ε = ε · bz/ε = L∗ + ε∗z.
Lht > 0 and z 6∈ {j : h
t
j > 0, j ∈ [k]− Z
t} (Equivalently, the flow decrease does not occur on the
constant link.) In this case, the flow does not decrease on the constant link (it decreases
collectively on linear links). The condition c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) implies that the flow on
all nonconstant links is on the increasing segments of their respective latency functions from
Lemma 15. The rate of decrease is (in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 10)
ε∑
j:htj>0,j∈[k]−Zt 1/aj
∑
j:htj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
2aj(h
t + h¯t)j + bj
aj
/
ε
≤
1∑
j:htj>0,j∈[k]−Zt 1/aj
∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
2ajfj + bj
aj
=
1∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt 1/aj
∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
L∗ + ε∗j
aj
. (15)
The first inequality follows from the next lemma which states that the two index sets in the
summation are the same and the fact that (ht + h¯t)j ≤ fj for j ∈ [k] − Z
t ⊆ [k] − S. The
second equality also follows because the two index sets in the summation are the same.
Lemma 22. Let β(h¯)r = h¯S + h¯U ≤ f∗. Then {j : htj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t} = {j : fj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t}
for all t ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. If j is contained in the left hand side, then htj > 0 and j 6∈ S since S ⊆ Z
t. Since the selfish
flow on all links is nonincreasing with time, we have htj ≤ h
0
j . We have fj = h¯
0
j + h
0
j ≥ h
t
j > 0. The
first equality holds since j 6∈ S.
If j is contained in the right hand side on the other hand, then j 6∈ Zt = {j : htj = 0}. Hence
htj > 0 and j is contained in the right hand side too.
7.4 Some sufficient conditions
We state some easy facts about the network in the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let f be the the Nash equilibrium in the network and g be the optimum solution. Let
h¯ be a Stackelberg strategy with β(h¯)r = h¯[k] ≤ f∗. Then
1. All links in S are bad links.
2. ε∗j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S.
3. fz > 0 implies ε
∗
z = 0, and fz = 0 implies ε
∗
z ≥ 0.
4. If j is such that fj > 0 and j ∈ Z
t for t ∈ [0, 1), then j is a bad link.
5. For all t ∈ [0, 1), and j ∈ Zt, ε∗j ≥ 0.
Proof. We will prove the first claim by contradiction. Assume the contrary: j is a good link and
j ∈ S. We have h¯[k] ≥ h¯S ≥ h¯j > fj ≥ f∗ where the second last inequality follows from the
definition of S and the last one follows from the definition of f∗ (f∗ is the minimum Nash flow on
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any good link). This is a contradiction to the assumption h¯[k] ≤ f∗. Therefore, links in S are bad
links.
For the second claim, let us consider the case j ∈ S and j 6= z. If fj = 0, then gj = 0 from the
conditions in Lemma 11. gj = 0 ⇐⇒ bj ≥ L
∗ ⇐⇒ L∗ + ε∗j ≥ L
∗ ⇐⇒ ε∗j ≥ 0. If fj > 0 on the
other hand, then fj > 0 ⇐⇒ bj < L =⇒ bj < L
∗ ⇐⇒ gj > 0. We have 2ajfj + bj = L∗ + ε∗j
from the definition of ε∗j and 2ajgj+bj = L
∗ from gj > 0. Subtracting the second one from the first
one we get ε∗j = 2aj(fj − gj) ≥ 0 since aj > 0 and fj ≥ gj (j is a bad link). Let us now consider
the case j ∈ S and j = z. In this case ε∗z ≥ 0 from Observation 5.
For the third claim, fz > 0 implies bz = L ≤ L
∗ ≤ bz (the last inequality follows from
Observation 5). Therefore, bz = L
∗ which is equivalent to ε∗z = 0. The second part follow from
Observation 5.
We will prove the fourth claim by contradiction; assume j is a good link. We will now show
that the amount of flow controlled by strategy h¯t is at least f∗, a contradiction since the amount
of flow controlled by h¯1 is at most f∗ and centrally controlled flow is monotonically increasing with
t, so the amount of flow controlled by h¯t for t < 1 must be strictly less than f∗. (We are assuming
that the amount of flow controlled by h¯t is strictly increasing in t, since otherwise S = ∅ and the
Stackelberg equilibrium is the same as the Nash equilibrium.)
If j ∈ S, then we are done from previous part which proves that all links in S are bad links.
So we assume that j 6∈ S. We have h0j = fj − h¯
0
j ≥ 0 from the fact that j 6∈ S. Also h
t
j = 0 since
j ∈ Zt. Since the amount of selfish flow is nonincreasing on all links, its amount has decreased
by at least h0j − h
t
j = fj − h¯
0
j = fj − h¯j from time 0 to t. By the conservation of total flow,
the amount of altruistic flow has increased by at least this amount from time 0 to t. Therefore
β(h¯t)r ≥ β(h¯0)r + (fj − h¯j) ≥ h¯j + (fj − h¯j) = fj ≥ f∗ where the last inequality follows by the
definition of f∗ and our assumption that j is a good link. This is a contradiction since β(h¯t)r must
be less than f∗ for t < 1. Hence j is a bad link.
For the fifth claim, recall the definition of Zt; Zt = {j : htj = 0}. For some t ∈ [0, 1) let us fix
an arbitrary j in Zt. We will prove that for this j, ε∗j ≥ 0. If j = z, then Observation 5 shows that
ε∗z ≥ 0. If j is a nonconstant link on the other hand, then we consider two cases. If fj = 0, then
gj = 0 from the condition of Lemma 11. gj = 0 =⇒ bj ≥ L
∗ ⇐⇒ L∗ + ε∗j ≥ L
∗ ⇐⇒ ε∗j ≥ 0. If
fj > 0, then we claim some properties of the link j:
1. gj > 0. This is because fj > 0 =⇒ bj < L =⇒ bj < L
∗ =⇒ gj > 0.
2. j 6∈ S. If j ∈ S, then the previous part proves that ε∗j ≥ 0 and we are done.
3. j is a bad link. This follows from the previous part and the fact that fj > 0 and j ∈ Z
t.
With these properties of the link j, we have 2ajfj + bj = L
∗ + ε∗j and 2ajgj + bj = L
∗ since gj > 0.
Subtracting the second inequality from the first one, we get ε∗j = 2aj(fj − gj) ≥ 0 since aj > 0 and
j is a bad link.
We now want to prove that the rate of increase is at least the rate of decrease for all cases.
We will derive some sufficient conditions for this and then show that the sufficient conditions hold.
The rate of increase is always given by the same expression in (14), but rate of decrease varies
depending on which links are involved in the decrement. We will consider these cases separately.
Case 1: Lht = 0 In this case, we need to prove that
L∗ + σ1ε∗s1 + · · · + σsε
∗
s|S|
≥ 0. (16)
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A sufficient condition for (16) to hold is
ε∗j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ S. (17)
This conditions always holds from Lemma 23.
Case 2: Lht > 0 and z ∈ {j : h
t
j > 0, j ∈ [k]− Z
t} In this case, the inequality to be proven be-
comes
L∗ + σ1ε∗s1 + · · ·+ σsε
∗
s|S|
≥ L∗ + ε∗z. (18)
A sufficient condition for inequality in (18) to hold is
ε∗j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ S and ε
∗
z = 0. (19)
These conditions also hold directly from Lemma 23, and the fact that fz > 0 since z ∈ {j :
htj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t} and {j : htj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t} = {j : fj > 0, j ∈ [k]−Z
t} from Lemma 22.
Case 3: Lht > 0 and z 6∈ {j : h
t
j > 0, j ∈ [k]− Z
t} In this case, either htz = 0 or z ∈ Z
t. The
inequality to be proven becomes
∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
L∗ + σ1ε∗s1 + · · ·+ σsε
∗
s|S|
aj
≥
∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
L∗ + ε∗j
aj
.
Canceling the L∗ terms, dividing by 2 and using Lemma 20, this is equivalent to proving
∑
j:fj>0,j∈[k]−Zt
σ1ε
∗
s1
+ · · · + σsε
∗
s|S|
2aj
≥
∑
j:fj>0,j 6=z,j∈Zt
−ε∗j
2aj
+ (gz − fz). (20)
The
∑
j:j 6=z,L≤bj≤L∗
L∗−bj
2aj
equals zero since {j : fj = 0, gj > 0} = ∅. A sufficient condition
for (20) to hold is the following:
ε∗j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S and ε
∗
j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Z
t − {z} and fz = gz. (21)
We show that these conditions also hold. The first two conditions hold from Lemma 23. For
the last condition, note that z 6∈ {j : htj > 0, j ∈ [k] − Z
t} = {j : fj > 0, j ∈ [k] − Z
t}, so
either fz = 0 or z ∈ Z
t.
If fz = 0, we have fz = gz = 0 from the assumption that there does not exist any link with
zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow. All the conditions of (21) are satisfied.
If fz > 0 and z ∈ Z
t, then z must be a bad link (see Lemma 23). It follows that fz ≥ gz.
But from Lemma 19, fz ≤ gz. It follows that fz = gz and all the conditions of (21) are again
satisfied.
This proves the entire claim.
To recap the proof, we started with the Nash equilibrium and transformed it, using the contin-
uous time process P , into a Stackelberg equilibrium. We proved that all through this modification,
the net rate of increase of the social cost was nonnegative (all the cases above dealt with various
possibilities for this). It hence follows that the social cost of the resulting end product (which is the
Stackelberg equilibrium) is no less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. The result of Lemma 11
hence follows.
16
8 Conclusion
We believe it would be interesting to try to find characterizations of the Stackelberg thresholds
for other classes of graphs: for parallel link graphs with more general latency functions, or for
linear latency functions in more general graphs. We would also like to carry forward the agenda of
considering tradeoffs in the size of altruistic coalitions versus the overall social cost in a variety of
games.
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